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LIES, LYRES, AND LAUGHTER: SURPLUS
POTENTIAL IN THE HOMERIC HYMN TO HERMES1
CHRISTOPHER BUNGARD

A

s students and scholars read the Homeric Hymn to Hermes, they often
notice that it does not quite fit with the other longer hymns. Alongside the
sadness of Demeter and the powerful might of Apollo, we find a baby god
who steals and lies his way into membership in the Olympian community. Whereas many scholars acknowledge the presence of humor within
the hymn, few have attempted to address the role that laughter plays in
its narrative.2 At four key moments in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes, we
observe Hermes, Apollo, and Zeus laugh in response to unexpected events.
Though most archaic Greek laughter is understood in terms of mockery
and derision, it is the goal of this paper to demonstrate how the laughter in
the Homeric Hymn to Hermes acknowledges splits in the perceived unity

1 I follow West 2003 for the text of the Homeric Hymn to Hermes. All translations of the
Greek are my own.
2 Van Herwerden 1907.181 sees the hymn as “insigne hoc priscae impietatis documentum.”
Schmid and Stählin 1929 see the hymn as co-opting Homeric seriousness in order to play
with it, but then go on to discuss it in terms of religious importance, where the laughter
takes away from moral potential. Allen, Halliday, and Sikes 1936 see the humor of the
hymn as part of a national spirit that also produced Old Comedy, but then move on to its
serious aspects. Sowa 1984 points to specific moments of humor, but apart from the idea
that humor arises from an exaggeration of the Wunderkind motif, there is little discussion
about why laughter should be a part of the hymn. Clay 1989 and Johnston 2002 and 2003
acknowledge that there is humor, but then discuss the Olympian community and performance contexts respectively. The major exceptions to this trend are Bielohlawek 1930,
where the analysis of humor is primarily a function of the hymn’s focus on the Kindheitsmotiv, and Szepes 1980, where the analysis largely focuses on humor as a result of
anachronistic events if we understand the hymn as composed at a time when merchants
had acquired equal standing with aristocrats.
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of Zeus’s cosmos. This laughter enables a process that is at the heart of
the hymn, transforming foe into friend.
Before turning to the hymn itself, it will be useful to briefly consider laughter in Homer in order to help us situate our thinking about the
hymn. Though most of the laughter in Homer can be thought of as indicating the superiority of the laugher,3 there are clear moments when laughter
can be seen as preserving communal unity by postponing strife. Stephen
Halliwell reads the laughter directed at Hephaistos’s antics (Il. 1.595–600)
as laughter that does precisely this. As Hephaistos draws attention to himself imitating a cupbearer such as Hebe or Ganymede, “the laughter of the
gods, on this premise, is positively appreciation of Hephaestus’ intentions,
not aimed at his lameness as such” (2008.63; see also Halliwell 1991).
Especially in the context of feasts, it should not be surprising that we have
a kind of laughter that preserves unity at precisely the moment when the
festive mode is threatened with division. As we turn to the Homeric Hymn
to Hermes, I want to draw our attention to laughter that arises at moments
of division. Rather than simply marking superiority, the laughter of the
hymn seems to recognize what I will call “surplus potential,” borrowing
from work on comedy by Alenka Zupančič (2008).4
Zupančič does not seek to create a universal understanding of
comedy, but she is interested in a certain kind of comedy that emerges
through short circuits that enable us to recognize a split in something otherwise perceived as unified and complete.5 When we think of a cupbearer,
we believe we have a clear idea about what this entails, but then there is,
for a brief moment, Hephaistos. Out of this split between the expected

3 Arnould 1990.49 notes that despite the evolution of laughter from Homer to tragedy and
philosophy, laughter remains a way to affirm power and put others in a position of inferiority. Jäkel 1994 lays out instances of laughter in the Iliad under the categories of mockery,
victory, friendly communication, and ritual laughter. It is on the first two categories that
most discussions of Greek laughter focus, as highlighted by the ancient philosophical discussions handled by Stewart 1994. Gilhus 1997 discusses instances of laughter throughout
the cultures of the Near East, where laughter is used to establish and mark the superiority
of the laughing gods. Passages that support the laughter of superiority in Homer include
the mocking of Thersites (Il. 2.265–70), laughing at Aias falling in dung (Il. 23.773–84),
and the laughter of the suitors throughout the Odyssey.
4 Given Hermes’ associations with laughter in Greek thinking, especially Aristophanes’
Peace and Wealth and Lucian’s Dialogi Deorum, it is not out of place to talk about Hermes
through the lens of comedy.
5 In this regard, Zupančič is interested in how comedy may help us better understand philosophy and Lacanian psychoanalysis.
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beauty of a cupbearer and the deformed blacksmith performing the role
emerges a surplus potential, which is the driving force of this comic mode.
As Zupančič suggests: “Not only do we (or the comic characters) not get
what we asked for, on top of it (and not instead of it) we get something
we haven’t even asked for at all. And we have to cope with this surprising
surplus, respond to it” (2008.132; emphasis in the original). We expect a
beautiful youth to be serving drinks, and when we do not get this, we are
not disappointed.6 We have not gotten what we asked for, but we latch on
to this unexpected cupbearer. We have the opportunity to see Hephaistos
take on the role, and much to our delight, we embrace the surplus. We are
willing to welcome even the deformed cupbearer because we see that he
is working in the interests of communal mirth.
At the same time, it is crucial that this split not break the perceived unity into two smaller unified entities. We cannot have a “proper
cupbearer” and a “failed cupbearer” when Hephaistos takes his turn at
playing the role. The surplus that emerges tells us something true about
the perceived unity (whether beautiful or deformed, a cupbearer provides a
means for communal mirth). In highlighting the split in the unified order,
this kind of comedy insists upon the failure of the cosmos to ever be full
and complete. We cannot split the cosmos up into smaller units so it might
find its perfect form. Instead, this kind of comedy embraces the internal
tensions highlighted by the surplus that reveals the internal split.7 This is
a world that accepts ambiguity within a given concept.
Though not primarily interested in Hermes and comedy, Laurence Kahn has in mind a similar process when dealing with Hermes.
Recognizing a connection between Hermes and Dionysos in disturbing
the perfect order often embodied by Apollo, Kahn suggests: “If Dionysos
is the Other, Hermes is simply uncertain alterity; if Dionysos destroys the
norm, Hermes jostles it to reconstruct it immediately” (1978.184).8 Rather
than allowing the unified cosmos to be split into smaller unities, Hermes

6 Disappointment is the dynamic of tragedy as Zupančič 2008.129 sees it. Using a Lacanian
model of the relationship between desire and satisfaction, she posits that tragedy stands on
the side of desire. When desire is not fully met—and desire never can be fully met—this
lack is felt as a loss.
7 Zupančič 2008.122 asks: “Does not one of the crucial dynamics of the comic consist
precisely in the fact that the more the two terms push each in its own direction, the more
violently the one of the two will eventually pull the other with it?”
8 “Si Dionysos est l’Autre, Hermès est simplement l’altérité incertaine; si Dionysos détroit
la norme, Hermès la bouscule pour la reconstruire aussitôt.”
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insists on reconfiguring the system in new ways, and through this work,
he brings to light surplus potentials that the Olympians will have to deal
with. The laughter that emerges from the recognition of these surpluses,
in turn, leads to a transformation of Zeus’s fully developed cosmos.
Turning to the Homeric Hymn to Hermes, we can think of the four
moments of laughter in the hymn as a clever ring composition on the part
of the hymnist:9 (1) Hermes laughs as he invents the lyre because he recognizes that it will help him establish a relationship with the gods; (2) Apollo
laughs in response to Hermes’ lie when he begins to warm up to this new
god; (3) Zeus laughs in response to Hermes’ lie when he welcomes Hermes
and his transformational energy as part of the cosmos; (4) Apollo laughs
as he hears the lyre that leads to his friendship with Hermes. Laughter
emerges when Hermes, a surplus to the established cosmos, negotiates
his place among the Olympians. Once Hermes has a firm place among the
Olympians, the tone of the hymn shifts when the hymnist details the oath
that assures friendship between the children of Zeus and the privileges that
will be Hermes’ for all time (cf. Graefe 1973.517).
LYRE AND LAUGHTER
Though the invention of the lyre appears in other accounts of the young
Hermes’ life, it plays an unusual part in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes.
Other versions that mention both the cattle raid and the invention of the
lyre usually have Hermes first steal the cattle and then invent the lyre.
Our hymnist has reversed the process.10 As Susan Shelmerdine suggests,
9 Several other versions of this myth include laughter or smiling. These occur primarily at
two moments in the myth: the Battos episode (Ovid’s Metamorphoses 2.676–707) and
Hermes’ attempt to steal Apollo’s bow (ScholD Il. 15.256, Horace Carmina 1.10, Philostratos Imagines 1.26). For the likelihood that Alcaeus’s Hymn to Hermes, P.Oxy. 2734
frag. 1, contains a similar moment of Apollo’s amusement when Hermes steals his bow,
see Page 1955 and Cairns 1983. Similarly, Lucian constructs Dialogi Deorum 11 around a
conversation between Apollo and Hephaistos about Hermes’ tendency to steal from other
gods. Apollo describes the young thief as προσγελᾷ πᾶσι (“with a laugh for everyone”). In
these versions, laughter or smiling seems restricted to one moment, whereas the Homeric
Hymn to Hermes enables the audience to contemplate the laughter of three gods at four
key moments in the hymn. Other brief or fragmentary accounts of this myth include the
Hesiodic Megalai Ehoiai, Antoninos Liberalis Metamorphoses 23, Pausanias 7.20.4, and
Nonnos Dionysiaka 1.337–40.
10 ScholD Il. 15.256 follows the Homeric Hymn to Hermes: the invention of the lyre followed
by the cattle theft. In Sophokles’ Ikhneutai (Radt frag. 314.284–331) and ps.-Apollodoros’s
Bibliotheca 3.10.2, the stolen cattle provide the hide for the later invention of the lyre.
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this reversal invites the audience to reorient their thinking about the myth
(1984.202). Instead of being a myth about Hermes’ attempt to supplant
Apollo, it is reasonable to think that the focus of this hymn is on the ultimate friendship of the two young gods, facilitated by the charm of the
lyre. Just as two songs by Hermes on his invention enable him to express
his change in status over the course of the hymn (the first a recollection of
his mother’s cave, the second a theogony that situates him in the broader
community),11 I suggest that the laughter that occurs in these two scenes
should also be thought about together.
Despite the wealthy holdings of his mother’s cave, Hermes is
unwilling to remain in seclusion.12 The young god sets out to gain membership in the Olympian community by stealing his brother’s cattle.13 Though
he sets out with a clear purpose, he is quickly distracted when he stumbles
across a tortoise. If we keep in mind Zupančič’s suggestion that the comic
emerges from surplus potentials, then we are in a better position to understand what it is that Hermes laughs at when he finds this tortoise. Instead of
rejecting the tortoise in favor of his planned target, Apollo’s cattle, Hermes
is ready to employ the tortoise for his overall project of obtaining a place
among the Olympians, and through the use of potentially contradictory
language, the hymnist prepares us to understand how Hermes perceives
this unexpected gift.14

11

12

13

14

Though recounting a version of the myth largely based on the Homeric Hymn to Hermes,
ps.-Apollodoros has removed all laughter from his telling.
Johnston (2002 and 2003) draws attention to this particular point in connection with issues
of maturation and initiation in the hymn. Szepes 1980.36 suggests the comic element in
the tortoise becoming lyre develops “because in the course of the process it grows above
its own possibilities.” She goes on to suggest that we should see in the transformation of
the lyre a prefiguring of the change in Hermes’ own status. While I agree with the second
point, I would emphasize that the tortoise could not undergo its transformation in Hermes’
hands if it were not for the unforeseen potentials already existing in the tortoise, potentials
that the hymnist’s and Hermes’ words help highlight.
It may be the case that the hymnist of the Homeric Hymn to Hermes has in mind a parallel with Odysseus, who is also kept away from his community by a daughter of Atlas. As
Shelmerdine 1986.57 suggests: “Hermes cannot reach his rightful place without leaving the
safety and comfort of his hidden paradise, the cave of the goddess, and fighting, whatever
the risk, for what he wants—his divine identity.” An important part of that identity is the
opportunity to embrace relationships with the Olympian community.
For discussions of the cattle raid as a means for young men to gain membership in the
adult community in Greece and the Near East, see Walcot 1979, Haft 1996, and Johnston
2002 and 2003.
It is appropriate that Hermes, the ambiguous god who is simultaneously generous and greedy,
as Kahn 1978.14 suggests, would stumble upon an animal that mimics his ambiguity.
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The hymnist describes the tortoise as “walking with a swagger in
its feet.”15 Thinking about the slow lumbering of a tortoise, we are unlikely
to equate tortoises with festive dancers.16 Hermes finds a slow moving herbivore, and yet he is ready to welcome it into the world of the feast as a
lyre that will accompany the fleet-footed dancing.
Equally, we might push further the hymnist’s use of the epithet
ἐριούνιος (28) in this context. Though “very beneficent” is appropriate
for Hermes as the god of the lucky find or hermaion, the hymnist has
opted to use this epithet right before the young god will speak in contradictory terms to the tortoise that he will deprive of life so that it might
charm a hostile Apollo later on. Through these subtle hints, the hymnist
is preparing us to listen to Hermes’ own thoughts about what it is that
he has stumbled across.
At this first example of laughter in the hymn, we should not be
surprised to find an emphasis on contradiction. Zupančič suggests that the
comic movement has two key aspects. It is not only that an apparent unity
(here a tortoise is a tortoise is a tortoise) splits, but also that in that split,
we come to see an inherent contradiction. It cannot be reduced simply to
itself (a tortoise is not just a tortoise).17 In spite of the split, the two sides
remain linked. Hermes’ speech to the tortoise exposes and embraces the
potential that comes from a tortoise that can be something different than a
tortoise, and part of the humor of his speech emerges in the non-coherence
of the tortoise.18
Following his laugh, Hermes’ very first word embraces a system
that does not add up neatly. He refers to the tortoise as a σύμβολον (30),
which in Greek can indicate both an omen and a tally. When we deal with
a σύμβολον, there is always something that moves beyond it, but this
surplus meaning is inevitably linked to it. Presented with something he

15 Homeric Hymn to Hermes 28: σαῦλα ποσὶν βαίνουσα.
16 Cf. Euripides’ Kyklops 40, where Silenos speaks of his comrades in part of Bakkhos’s entourage as σαυλούμενοι (“swaggering”), and Aristophanes’ Wasps 1173, where Philokleon
refers to his dancing as σαυλοπρωκτιᾶν (“rump shaking”).
17 See Zupančič 2008.54–56 for a more detailed discussion of this process. Borrowing from
Lacan, Zupančič uses the topology of the Möbius strip to illustrate the illusion of the split.
Though we might perceive two sides to the strip, there is only really one surface as we
travel around it.
18 Interestingly, in two instances of laughter in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes (281 and 389),
the laughter is a reaction to Hermes’ actions, which would blend well with Kahn’s 1978.16
image of Hermes as non-cohesive.

Surplus Potential in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes

149

never asked for, Hermes laughs and acknowledges that there is more to
the tortoise than we might first think. As he shifts from amused discovery to addressing the tortoise, Hermes continues to develop the idea that
we should not think about this tortoise simply as the mountain-dwelling
herbivore it appears to be.
His opening words to the tortoise abound in the same kind of
contradiction that the hymnist employed when Hermes first found his
future lyre (31–33).
χαῖρε, φυὴν ἐρόεσσα, χοροιτύπε, δαιτὸς ἑταίρη,
ἀσπασίη προφανεῖσα. πόθεν τόδε καλὸν ἄθυρμα,
αἰόλον ὄστρακον ἕσσο, χέλυς ὄρεσι ζώουσα;
Welcome, you lovely in shape, beating the ground in
dance, companion of the feast, a glad tiding. Where did
you get this beautiful plaything, this dappled shell that
clothes you, tortoise dwelling in the mountains?
Hermes is able to connect the tortoise’s walk with the movements of Greek
dancing, and the lumbering tortoise is quickly transformed in Hermes’
mind into the lyre that accompanies the swift dancing of the feast. Hermes
continues imagining the tortoise in a festive context when he refers to its
shell as an ἄθυρμα. What is for the tortoise an essential protective covering will become for Hermes the resonating chamber of his new lyre. Even
before he has actually invented the lyre, he imagines the tortoise in its festive context. His opening salvo begins to expose the contradiction between
the living, lumbering tortoise and the swiftness that one associates with
the dead tortoise in the form of a lyre.19
Hermes proceeds to echo the Hesiodic proverb that it is better to
be inside, since the outside world is dangerous (36), but this happens right
before Hermes will deprive the tortoise of life by disemboweling it. We
might understand this twist on Hesiod as the work of an inveterate liar, but
there may be an explanation, as discussed by Yannis Tzifopolous, which
lies in the surplus of Hermes’ final words to the tortoise (37–38).

19 It is worth noting that Zupančič 2008.58–59 sees acceleration as one of the ways that
comedy exposes the internal contradiction of any perceived unity.
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ἦ γὰρ ἐπηλυσίης πολυπήμονος ἔσσεαι ἔχμα
ζώους᾽ ἢν δὲ θάνῃς, τότε <δ᾽> ἄν μάλα καλὸν ἀείδοις.
Alive you will be a charm against baneful witchcraft. If
you die, then you will sing quite beautifully.

As a latecomer, Hermes interacts with Zeus’s cosmos in a different way
than an established god like Apollo might. The Homeric Hymn to Apollo
and the Homeric Hymn to Hermes are set at opposite ends of the story of
Zeus’s command, as Jenny Strauss Clay reminds us (1989.96). Apollo is
born as Zeus’s order is solidifying. As a result, he comes to life claiming
his timai unopposed, and when faced with rivals, he quickly eliminates
them.20 Hermes is born into a world that has already been established.
Instead of eliminating rivals, he must negotiate a place for himself alongside the other gods. In order for him to join the Olympians, he needs a
world that is full of surplus potential that can be exploited to restructure
the cosmos—not for the sake of supplanting his elders, but to become
integrated into their order.21 Here Hermes embraces the multiple potentials of the tortoise. As Tzifopoulos argues, Hermes is interested in the
tortoise as something that will sit on either side of spell-casting. Alive it
wards off spells, but in death as a lyre, it becomes the spell-caster.22 By
embracing an additional capacity of tortoises as enchanters, Hermes equips
himself with a tool that will prove useful toward the end of the hymn,
where laughter reappears for the final time. We might then think about
Hermes’ laughter as the laughter he, as an outsider, hopes will mark his
own acceptance into the cosmos—the unexpected surplus that becomes a
recognizable part of the cosmos.23

20 Cf. the Homeric Hymn to Apollo 131–32 and the episodes with Pytho and Telphousa. There
is emphasis in the Pythian portion of the hymn on Apollo founding important sanctuaries
of the Greek world at the expense of those already in place.
21 In dealing with the contrasts between Hermes’ sacrifice in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes
and the myth of Prometheus cheating the gods of choice meats in sacrifice, Kahn 1978.95
suggests that what Hermes illustrates is a split that does not reveal tension, a tear, or strife
(“ce n’est pas la scission que révèlent ces tensions, ce n’est pas la déchirure ni l’Eris”),
but rather that potential splits caused by Hermes are ultimately about integration.
22 Tzifopoulos 2000.152–53 argues that this understanding helps us comprehend the ambiguity in βέλτερον (“better”) in line 36. For more on the relationship between poetry and
spell-casting, see Parry 1992.
23 Arnould 1990.85 suggests that the laughter of Hermes does not come from the comical
appearance of the tortoise, but rather upon reflection concerning the advantage that it
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LAUGHTER INSIDE MAIA’S CAVE
When we look at the initial encounter between Apollo and Hermes, we
notice that there is a marked shift from Apollo’s threats of Tartaros and the
underworld to a curious admiration for Hermes’ abilities as thief. This shift
is punctuated by a moment of gentle laughter (ἁπαλὸν γελάσας, 281) that
helps prepare the audience for the laughter of Zeus at the trial on Olympos. Though not entirely the same kind of laughter as Hermes’ when he
invented the lyre, Apollo’s laughter reacts to a split in the cosmos created
by Hermes—here between one’s expectations concerning cattle rustlers
and the reality that this cattle rustler is a little baby.
Informed by a bird omen that the thief of his cattle is a son of
Zeus (213–14), Apollo bursts into the cave of Hermes’ mother and initially
tries to find the cattle by himself.24 When it becomes clear that he cannot,
he attacks the wily baby (254–59).
ὦ παῖ ὃς ἐν λίκνῳ κατάκειαι, μήνυέ μοι βοῦς
θᾶσσον· ἐπεὶ τάχα νῶϊ διοισόμεθ᾽ οὐ κατὰ κόσμον.
ῥίψω γάρ σε λαβὼν ἐς Τάρταρον ἠερόεντα,
ἐς ζόφον αἰνόμορον καὶ ἀμήχανον· οὐδέ σε μήτηρ
ἐς φάος οὐδὲ πατὴρ ἀναλύσεται, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ γαίῃ
ἐρρήσεις ὀλίγοισι μετ᾽ ἀνδράσιν ἡγεμονεύων.
Boy, you who lie in your crib, show me the cows quickly,
since soon the two of us will not part in gentlemanly fashion. I will pick you up and cast you into murky Tartaros,
into the dreaded and inescapable darkness. Neither your
mother nor father will bring you back up into the light, but
you will go beneath the earth, leader among the little men.
In an attempt to bully Hermes into revealing the location of the cattle by
referring to Tartaros, Apollo co-opts the language that is more appropriate
will provide him. I would emphasize that the advantage that Hermes gains comes in part
from his ability to find the unexpected in the tortoise—its dance-like gait and toy shell.
By embracing the surplus potential of his accidental find, Hermes creates for himself an
enchanter.
24 There is the suggestion that a seduction is underway, as van Nortwick 1980.4 argues. As
a result of the mention of gold, silver, nectar, and ambrosia, an ear well-trained to archaic
Greek patterns should anticipate that Hermes will hoodwink Apollo in some way.
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for the young Zeus establishing the Olympian order.25 Because he views
Hermes as a threat to himself and the well-ordered cosmos, he threatens
to do to Hermes what father Zeus did to Hermes’ own great-grandfather,
Iapetos.26 If performed successfully, this act would ensure that Apollo could
maintain the stable world that has been upset by the young god. As Sarah E.
Harrell notes: “The act [of hurling to Tartaros] is effective on two levels.
Physically, Zeus deprives his opponents of strength and banishes them permanently from Olympus. Symbolically, his victims serve as reminders of
the irrevocable consequences, an ultimate failure, of any attempt to defy
him. They become a warning against future rebellion” (1991.315). Hermes
would not only be deprived of his ability to disrupt Zeus’s cosmos, but he
would also stand as yet one more reminder of what happens to those who
disrupt the stability of the world.
At the same time, Apollo’s threats introduce a conundrum that
reflects the general ambiguity of Hermes if we think back to Kahn’s analysis
of Hermes (see above p. 145). As Onofrio Vox argues (1981.109), there is a
fundamental contradiction between Apollo’s threat to cast Hermes into Tartaros and the threat that Hermes shall end up in Hades as a leader of little
men. Whereas the threat of Tartaros is perfectly appropriate for rebellious
gods, the threat that Hermes will be sent into Hades is more appropriate
for mortals.27 It is possible that we should understand the threat of banishment to Hades as the hyperbole of an outraged bully, but it does open up
the possibility for Hermes to respond in a comic mode.
We have seen through Zupančič that the comic emerges from a
surplus, and the contradiction introduced by Apollo (should we understand Hermes as god or as mortal?) opens up space for the comic mode
to take over.28 Once a surplus erupts onto the scene, it is possible to keep

25 This depiction of Apollo as a mini-Zeus appears in other texts as well. Cf. the Homeric
Hymn to Apollo 375–87, where Apollo crushes Telphousa under rocks in order to punish
her for opposing his attempt to establish his position in the cosmos.
26 The fate of Hermes’ grandfather, Atlas, also stands as a reminder of what can happen to
those who try to oppose Zeus.
27 In Philostratos, the threat is only that Apollo will push Hermes under the Earth. Kahn
1978.60–61 notes that we see a similar confusion between god and mortal in Hermes’
sacrifice of the cattle. As he creates no hierarchy of gods, he also blurs the clear boundaries between gods and mortals.
28 Szepes 1980.32 suggests that the comedy of the scene emerges from the outdated views
of Apollo (“there is no need of a new god on the Olympus”). Though a certain level of
comedy emerges in the conflict between the two gods, there is more at stake than the vic-
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comic activity going by insisting on the contradictions.29 Apollo has indirectly raised a challenge to Hermes: prove to me that you really are a god!
Hermes is ready to do so by portraying himself as just a baby, insisting
upon Apollo’s very first word παῖ.30 As he develops the image of himself as
a tender baby (263–73), he is doing more than simple child’s play.31 Hermes
can highlight characteristics that help him succeed as a thief. Stealth is
naturally the most important tool in the thief’s arsenal. Because of his
youth, we might overlook Hermes when searching for a thieving culprit.
By not looking the part, Hermes is more capable of theft than he would be
if he looked like the type of person we would expect to be stealing cattle.32
Though this strategy of proving himself a god by emphasizing his status
as baby is counterintuitive, it is only at the level of the gods that we can
find a successful baby who is adept at rustling cattle.
In response to Hermes’ insistence that he is, in fact, a baby, Apollo
laughs softly (ἁπαλὸν γελάσας, 281). Dominique Arnould highlights several examples of laughter from adults at children that indicate superiority (1990.86–87).33 We may be inclined to think of Apollo’s laughter as
yet another moment of mocking superiority—Hermes is no threat to the
established and older Apollo. At the same time, we should be attentive to

29

30

31
32

33

tory of one viewpoint over the other. We should keep in mind that the hymn ultimately
ends on a note of mutual friendship between Hermes and Apollo.
Zupančič 2008.140: “The art of comedy is precisely a singular continuity-through-interruption, a continuity that, as I have already stressed, builds with—and is built through—
interruptions and breaks, a continuity that constructs with discontinuity, a continuity whose
very stuff is a discontinuity.”
Though ὦ παῖ is perfectly appropriate for addressing younger people in Greek, it is unusual
to use this form of address in the singular without a patronymic, as Wendel 1929.98 observes.
In developing the contrast between Hermes’ Olympian ambitions and Apollo’s anger over
the cattle, Greene 2005.346 notes that Apollo “classifies Hermes merely as a child in his
cradle (ὦ παῖ ὃς ἐν λίκνῳ κατάκειαι) and he demands to be told of his cattle.” On the
address παῖ, see also Dickey 1996.
Halliwell 2008.19 draws attention to laughter’s connection in Greek with play (παιζεῖν)
and children (παῖς).
We should keep in mind the emphasis on Hermes’ ability to confound vision when he
reverses the cattle’s tracks and disguises his own through the use of sandals. The Old Man
of Onkhestos expresses his difficulty in putting into words precisely what it was that he
saw when he saw Hermes with Apollo’s cattle (202–11).
As parallels to the laughter of Apollo here, see, in Homer, Zeus laughing at Artemis (Il.
21.507–08) and Athena smiling at Odysseus (Od. 13.287–92). Arnould 1990.175 also notes
that laughter combined with speech usually has a tone of superiority (cf. Il. 11.378–79,
21.408–09, Od. 16.354, 17.542–43, 18.35, and 18.163), but it may, on the contrary, reunite
a group (cf. Il. 2.270, Od. 8.326, 18.320–21, and 20.358–59).
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the way that this laughter is modified. By conditioning Apollo’s laughter
as ἁπαλὸν, the hymnist employs a phrase only otherwise used in Odyssey
14.463–66, where Odysseus places “soft laughter” in the context of drinking, singing, and dancing. Arnould notes the connection in Greek lyric
between ἁπαλὸν and amorous contexts (1990.166), and Halliwell suggests
that the soft laughter of Odysseus “evokes a state that is both self-indulgent
and untroubled” (2008.87). Coupled with Apollo’s immediate response,
these two points suggest that we need to think about the laughter here in a
more sophisticated way than the simple indulgence of a precocious youth.
Apollo changes his tone as a result of Hermes’ comic performance.
Where before Hermes was a nameless child lying in a crib, Apollo now
says to Hermes (282, 289–92),
ὦ πέπον, ἠπεροπευτὰ, δολοφραδές
...
ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε, μὴ πύματόν τε καὶ ὕστατον ὕπνον ἰαύσῃς,
ἐκ λίκνου κατάβαινε, μελαίνης νυκτὸς ἑταῖρε.
τοῦτο γὰρ οὖν καὶ ἔπειτα μετ᾽ ἀθανάτοις γέρας ἕξεις.
ἀρχὸς φιλητέων κεκλήσεαι ἤματα πάντα.
My good man, deceptive, wily-minded . . . But come on,
lest you sleep your last and final sleep, get up out of your
crib, companion of black night. For then you will have
this privilege among the immortals, you will be called
leader of robbers for all days.
Abandoning the bullying language of Zeus’s mastery, Apollo addresses
Hermes as πέπον, a mark of affection between members of a shared
community.34 Expulsion from the company of the gods into the endless

34 Apollo deploys πέπον again at the end of the hymn when he is trying to negotiate a deal
for the lyre (457). As Wendel 1929.21 catalogues, πέπον is used throughout the Iliad at
moments when a character is urging a comrade to a particular action. Cf. Il. 9.252 (Odysseus to Akhilles), 11.314 (Odysseus to Diomedes), 11.765 (Nestor to Patroklos), 12.322
(Sarpedon to Glaukos), 15.472 (Aias to Teuker), and 17.179 (Hektor to Glaukos). The use
of the participle κερτομέων (“taunt,” “slag,” 300) also suggests that we should begin to see
Apollo and Hermes as part of a shared community. The hymnist employs the exact same
verb in 56 as Hermes experiments with the lyre like κοῦροι at symposiastic feasts where,
as Halliwell 2008.103 suggests, “this ( κερτομεῖν ) counts as a special ‘language-game’
which is (partly) exempted from the normal consequences of confrontational exchanges of
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gloom of Tartaros has been replaced with the acknowledgement of one of
Hermes’ future roles as an Olympian (master of thieves). Apollo has not
yet befriended Hermes, but we should hear in his laughter the beginning
of the process that will lead to their ultimate friendship at the close of the
hymn.35 If we think about the laughter of the Homeric Hymn to Hermes
as laughter that recognizes surplus potentials (a baby capable of rustling
cattle and cleverly playing with his image), then we can begin to understand why Apollo changes his tone. Though he is still annoyed about his
missing cattle, he shifts his relationship with Hermes through the change
from ὦ παῖ to ὦ πέπον, a shift punctuated by laughter, and thereby he signals his curious admiration for Hermes’ skills.
LAUGHTER ON OLYMPOS
When the hymn shifts from Kyllene to Olympos, Hermes has his fi rst
opportunity to appeal directly to his father for recognition of his status
as Zeus’s son and rightful Olympian. Much discussion of the Olympos
scene has centered on whether or not Hermes perjures himself.36 I propose that we look more closely at the rest of his defense, during which
Hermes develops, through a clever manipulation of legalistic speech,
another split in Zeus’s cosmos. Zeus’s laughter welcomes his son’s ability to create this new surplus, which arises from the incoherence of a
baby who is skilled in legalistic speech. Just as Hermes is surely a god
by being a baby who is also an expert cattle rustler, so, too, does Hermes

abuse.” Much like modern Irish slagging, where friends trade insults as a show of friendship, κερτομέων here should not be understood as antagonistic.
35 So long as the stolen cattle remain an issue, Apollo and Hermes cannot be reconciled, but,
as Hyde 1998.71 argues, “Apollo’s laugh marks the moment at which he first loosens his
grip on the cattle; his laughter melts his righteous anger and a touch of detachment enters.”
36 Callaway 1993 explores the issue of oaths in Homer and the Homeric Hymn to Hermes.
Fletcher 2008 has expanded upon Callaway specifically as regards the Homeric Hymn to
Hermes. Both scholars are of the opinion that Hermes carefully uses oath practice in order
to gain admission among the Olympians while avoiding perjury. Callaway also contains a
concise summary of the oath issue in previous scholarship. To sum up her work quickly,
Sowa 1984 asserts that both the oath proposed to Apollo and that proposed to Zeus are
false. Allen and Sikes 1904 argue that the oath proposed to Apollo is false, whereas the
wording of the oath proposed to Zeus steers clear of perjury. Baumeister 1860 and Gemoll 1886 focus on discrepancies in the wording of Hermes’ oath to Zeus, and Clay 1989
argues that the literal reading of Hermes’ two proposed oaths protects him from perjury.
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confi rm his divinity by being the baby who can hold his own in court
against the older Apollo.37
Even before Apollo has the opportunity to present his case to his
father, Zeus immediately recognizes potential in Hermes that may not be
immediately apparent. He seems to welcome Hermes by referring to him as
“satisfying loot” (μενοεικέα ληΐδ’, 330 ) and by acknowledging Hermes’
resemblance to a κῆρυξ. Just as Apollo may have created an opportunity
through his contradictory threat for Hermes to embrace the comic spirit,
so Zeus may do so here through the ironic use of σπουδαῖον (“seriousness,” 332) in referring to the little baby who has confounded Apollo. We
are confronted with the incoherence between Apollo’s frustration with the
difficulty of recovering his cattle and Zeus’s amused perception of a baby
who looks like a herald.
At the same time, Hermes finds himself in a dilemma as an infant
trickster. Given the Greek belief of the truth in wine and children (οἶνος
καὶ παῖδες ἀληθεῖς), any tricks that Hermes tries to pull are doomed to
failure. Embracing his status as a child, Hermes is prepared to claim to
speak the truth (ἀληθείην, 368), which we would expect from a child,
but upon further reflection, we find a child who is not simply a child.
Instead, we find a child who can manipulate legal conventions, a child
who must be a god.38
Thomas Cole argues that we need to understand ἀλήθεια not
as an idea that exists in things, but rather as one that we find in people
(1983.7–8).39 As such, this kind of truth is marked by “completeness,
non-omission of any relevant particular, whether through forgetting or
ignoring” (1983.10). As Hermes develops his “true” defense, the kind of
truth marked by completeness and non-omission slips from the account
that Hermes actually delivers. In response to Apollo’s narrative of events
(340–64), Hermes emphasizes the actions of Apollo. He complains that

37 Szepes 1980.37–47 explores this episode as a parody of Solon’s reforms. She only briefly
mentions the laughter of Zeus, and the discussion turns more towards the social dynamics
between aristocrats and merchants.
38 Szepes 1980.43 argues that Hermes’ insistence on his status as child is an attempt to extract
himself from the legal process. As a child, he could not be brought to court. Given the
early emphasis by the hymnist on Hermes’ desire to gain his rightful place among the gods
(163–81), it seems equally important to understand this trial as an opportunity for Hermes
to win approval from his father.
39 This argument stands in contrast to Heidegger’s understanding of ἀλήθεια as the “unhidden.” In particular, see Heidegger 1996.29 and 202–05.
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Apollo has overstepped his bounds by failing to bring witnesses, bullying
him to reveal the location of the cattle, and threatening to throw him into
Tartaros (370–74). He then emphasizes the disparity between the mighty
Apollo and the harmless baby that he pretends to be (375–77).40 While he
has spoken accurately about Apollo’s breaches in proper conduct, Hermes
has thus far failed to discuss his own actions.
The closest that he comes to making any statement about his own
activity is hedged by language that emphasizes the relationship that he
desires to have with the community of the gods (378–80).
πείθεο, καὶ γὰρ ἐμεῖο πατὴρ φίλος εὔχεαι εἶναι,
ὡς οὐκ οἴκαδ᾽ ἔλασσα βόας ὡς ὄλβιος εἴην,
οὐδ᾽ ὑπὲρ οὐδὸν ἔβην· τὸ δέ τ᾽ ἀτρεκέως ἀγορεύω.
Trust me (you even boast that you are my dear father)
that I did not drive the cattle home in order to be rich.41 I
did not cross the threshold. I say this precisely.
Speaking very precisely, Hermes’ only comments on his own activity are
confined to two brief claims, but these claims are surrounded by language
that focuses on his relationship with the gods. He begins with an appeal
to Zeus for trust, which he emphasizes through the parenthetical appeal to
Zeus to recognize his claims of fatherhood.42 If Zeus really is his father,
then Zeus should believe him since this is what fathers do. The father of
gods and men has an opportunity to embrace and engage in a relationship with his recently born son. By asking his father to trust him, Hermes
implies that the relationship that exists between them preempts the facts.
So long as trust is maintained, there is no need for the facts.

40 Homeric Hymn to Hermes 370–77: ἦλθεν ἐς ἡμετέρου διζήμενος εἰλίποδας βοῦς / σήμερον
ἠελίοιο νέον ἐπιτελλομένοιο, / οὐδὲ θεῶν μακάρων ἄγε μάρτυρας οὐδὲ κατόπτας· /
μηνύειν δ᾽ ἐκέλευεν ἀναγκαίης ὑπὸ πολλῆς, / πολλὰ δέ μ᾽ ἠπείλησε βαλεῖν ἐς Τάρταρον
εὐρύν, / οὕνεχ᾽ ὃ μὲν τέρεν ἄνθος ἔχει φιλοκυδέος ἥβης, / αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ χθιζὸς γενόμην—
τὰ δέ τ᾽ οἶδε καὶ αὐτός— / οὔ τι βοῶν ἐλατῆρι κραταιῷ φωτὶ ἐοικώς.
41 I diverge from West 2003 in 379. If we read ὡς in the last clause, then Hermes’ response
adds one more loophole for him to slip out through. If an opponent can prove that he did
drive the cattle home, then he is still left with the argument that his reasoning was not for
the sake of profit.
42 Greene 2005.347 is right to draw attention to the strategic address of Zeus as ζεῦ πάτερ
in 368. This is presumably the first time that Zeus has met Hermes and vice versa.
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As Hermes continues to carefully craft his defense, an interesting pattern develops. Before he makes any claims about his own activity,
he conditions these claims through appeals to relationships. Following the
claim that Zeus should trust that he did not do what Apollo claims he has,
Hermes immediately appeals to the respect he has for the gods, his love for
Zeus, and the dreadful awe that he has for Apollo before turning back to
Zeus to assert his lack of guilt (381–83). The speech that should be without
gaps, partly because of Hermes’ own claim to speak ἀληθείην and partly
as a condition of his status as a child, does not provide arguments to disprove the claims made by Apollo. It does not fully address what Hermes
has done, but rather it seeks to establish innocence through claims that he
respects the divine order.
We notice that this defense is a clever and comic manipulation of
legal language even when Hermes prepares to deliver his mighty oath, a
parody of divine oaths with its odd guarantor, the well-decked porticoes of
gods. Rather than offering an oath to his innocence, he swears (385–86),
μή ποτ’ ἐγω τούτῳ τείσω ποτὲ νηλέα φωρήν
καὶ κρατερῷ περ ἐόντι· σὺ δ’ ὁπλοτέροισιν ἄρηγε.
I will never, ever pay [Apollo] for that pitiless theft, even
if he is strong. You, support younger ones.
Hermes’ final words cement the nature of this defense. As a child, he will
naturally speak ἀληθείην, and as Zeus’ child, he expects the support of
his father against the arrogant actions of his older half-brother. He has
not made a defense that proves his innocence so much as he has made a
defense that establishes in very clear terms why he should not be punished
as a member of the Olympian community.
When Hermes finishes his defense, the hymnist draws specific
attention to Hermes as a baby through a reference to the blanket that he
keeps wrapped around his shoulders (388). As we in the audience listen to
Hermes’ clever response to Apollo’s accusations, we may have lost track of
the fact that we are still dealing with Hermes as a baby. A comic surplus
has burst into Olympos in the form of Hermes, the baby who proves himself
skilled in legal wrangling, and if we keep this in mind as we hear Zeus’s
response, we are in a better position to understand why it is that he laughs.
There can be no doubt that Zeus sees through Hermes’ attempts
to dodge Apollo’s accusations (389–90). At the same time, there seems to
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be something more than the laugh of superiority that we see with Zeus
in Homer.43 Halliwell suggests that part of the laughter of Zeus here, and
Apollo earlier, comes from “knowing appreciation of his precocious guile”
(2008.100).44 I would also add that the laughter that appreciates Hermes’
precocity stems from Zeus’s ability to recognize that Hermes is genuinely
more than he appears to be. Just as Hermes could see a lyre in a living
tortoise, so Zeus has already identified the potential of his son to be a herald. Thus we should hear in Zeus’s laughter a delight similar to Hermes’
when he finds the surplus potentials in the tortoise.
The laughter of Zeus that welcomes Hermes into the Olympian
order quickly shifts to the need for reconciliation between the squabbling
brothers. Thinking back to Zupančič, the comic spirit of this hymn cannot
ultimately function if Hermes supplants Apollo. The split between the two
gods cannot allow them to fall apart into two separate entities. Interestingly, then, this hymn concludes by shifting from Hermes’ acceptance into
the broad community of the gods to building an enduring link between the
very different sons of Zeus.
LAUGHTER THAT CEMENTS FRIENDSHIP
Now that Hermes has gained acceptance from Zeus, the hymn shifts focus
from cosmic acceptance as part of Zeus’s order to the personal connection between the two sons of Zeus. Whereas they approached Olympos as
Hermes and far-darting Apollo, they depart Olympos as the very beautiful
children of Zeus (∆ιὸς περικαλλέα τέκνα, 397). The connection between
the gods is reinforced all the more through the hymnist’s use of the dual.45
Zeus has accepted his children, though he has left it up to them to resolve
their dispute. The lyre, welcomed into the world by Hermes’ laughter,
reappears as the tool that will facilitate friendship between the two gods.46

43 As remarked above, Arnould 1990.86–87 notes moments of parents laughing at their
children.
44 On a similar note, Callaway 1993.24 suggests: “It may be that Apollo and Zeus, as the
gods with superior status in the situation, can afford to be generous and overlook the lies.
It may be that craftiness and ambition, like love, receive their just rewards.”
45 Homeric Hymn to Hermes 397–98: τὼ δ᾽ ἄμφω σπεύδοντε ∆ιὸς περικαλλέα τέκνα / ἐς
Πύλον ἠμαθόεντα ἐπ᾽ Ἀλφειοῦ πόρον ἷξον.
46 The emphasis of the final movement of the hymn is on reciprocal exchange. I agree with
Brown 1947.88: “The truth is that the terms of the bargain have been misunderstood.
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Once again, the hymnist punctuates this moment with laughter, as Apollo
marvels at the sudden emergence of the lyre.
When Apollo sees the hides of the slaughtered cattle, he is
astounded by the might of his brother. He attempts to bind Hermes, who
immediately causes the bindings to ensnare Apollo’s cattle as well.47 A possible lacuna in the text poses some problems. We can gather that Hermes
has seen something that will anger Apollo. Whether the lacuna would
inform us what Hermes has seen or draw our attention to an expression
of Apollo’s anger,48 the result is the reappearance of the lyre. The hymnist
carefully reminds us of Hermes’ initial experiment with the lyre by echoing the language that precedes the song.49 Even before Hermes has the
opportunity to sing his second song (420–23),
γέλασσε δὲ Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων
γηθήσας, ἐρατὴ δὲ διὰ φρένας ἤλυθ᾽ ἰωή
θεσπεσίης ἐνοπῆς, καί μιν γλυκὺς ἵμερος ᾕρει
θυμῷ ἀκουάζοντα.
Phoibos Apollo laughed and rejoiced. The lovely sound
of the divine strain came over his heart, and sweet longing took hold of him in his soul as he listened.

Hermes does not lose the lyre, Apollo does not lose the cattle; they agree to share both
lyre and cattle. Each initiates the other into his own art.”
47 Kahn 1978.115 sees in this episode an important contrast between Hermes and Dionysos.
Whereas Dionysos breaks the bindings of the sailors, Hermes embraces his.
48 The manuscript tradition contains no lacuna. Difficulties in the language of the text
have led some to hypothesize a lacuna somewhere in this section. Following Baumeister 1860, Allen 1912 indicates a lacuna after line 415, suggesting the lacuna indicates
what Hermes saw. West 2003 places one after line 416, creating a scenario in which
Apollo demands compensation for his cattle. In contrast, Càssola 1975 sees no need for
a lacuna, explaining 415 as Hermes hiding the fire in his eyes and replacing λαβὼν in
418 with λύρην.
49 Cf. the Homeric Hymn to Hermes 52–54 with 418–20:
φέρων ἐρατεινὸν ἄθυρμα
πλήκτρῳ ἐπειρήτιζε κατὰ μέλος, ἣ δ᾽ ὑπὸ χειρός
σμερδαλέον κονάβησε.
λαβὼν δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀριστερὰ χειρός
πλήκτρῳ ἐπειρήτιζε κατὰ μέλος, ἣ δ᾽ ὑπὸ χειρός
σμερδαλέον κονάβησε.
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Drawing our attention through repetition to the sound the lyre makes when
Hermes plays, the hymnist also wants to draw our attention to the connection between the laughter of Hermes before he invents the lyre and the
laughter of Apollo when he first hears it.50 The transformed tortoise has
been tucked away for precisely this moment, and now we need to think
about what it is about the lyre that makes Apollo laugh.
Arnould notes that laughter is commonly associated with the discovery of a new instrument (1990.218).51 Part of the wonder that comes
with the discovery of any new technology, as Kahn suggests, comes from
“the gap between the idea of clever machinery and its product which seems
to largely surpass it” (1978.129).52 Disturbed at finding some of his cattle
slaughtered by his troubling half-brother, Apollo is suddenly confronted
with the sound of the lyre, the dead tortoise that has been given new life
by Hermes in its combination with cow hides, sheep gut, and wood.53 We
should keep in mind that Zupančič (2008.56–58) argues that one of the
important ways that comedy exposes surplus potential is through the sudden intrusion of the other side—here the power of the “voice” of the dead
tortoise.54 Through his joyous laughter at the sound of the tortoise-lyre,
Apollo indicates his curiosity about how to respond to this unexpected
thing that has erupted into Zeus’s cosmos.
Following Hermes’ song, a theogony that situates him properly
within Zeus’s cosmos, Apollo finally has the opportunity to ask about this
new instrument. While Hermes perceives and exploits the surplus potentials that others have overlooked, Apollo approaches the world as if everything already exists and simply needs to be discovered.55 As part of the
50 Haft 1996.29 notes the role that humor and laughter play in the negotiations of Glendiot
cattle raiders as they seek membership in the adult community.
51 In an interesting contrast, the satyrs and Silenos of Sophokles’ Ikhneutai (Radt frag. 314)
feel pain as a result of the sound of the lyre (131 and 205).
52 “[Thauma] recouvre l’écart entre l’idée de machinerie astucieuse et son produit qui semble
l’excéder largement.”
53 Kahn 1978.124 finds a foreshadowing of the friendship of Hermes and Apollo in the linkage of different animals to make the lyre.
54 There is an extended dialogue in Sophokles’ Ikhneutai (Radt frag. 314.299–312) between
Kyllene and the chorus about the nature of the lyre. The dialogue involves guessing what
kind of an animal could make such a sound. The conclusion to the guessing game neatly
preserves the internal split in the lyre: Hermes calls the animal a tortoise, but the thing
that makes noise a lyre.
55 It is important to think about the gods in relationship to each other, as Vernant 1980.99
reminds us. In this capacity, Hermes and Apollo appear in a similar capacity to Hermes
and Hestia. As Vernant 1983 famously argues, Hestia stands in the middle and stands for
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established order, Apollo offers two possible origins for the lyre: Hermes
was either born with it or he was given it by some other god (440–42).
Due to his attachment to the existing world, he has difficulty imagining
that Hermes himself has invented the new instrument. Brought together
by the persuasive mind of Zeus, the beautiful children of Zeus exemplify
two extremes for how we may approach the world around us. On the one
hand, we may look at the world as an infinitely flexible place. A tortoise
can quickly be transformed into a lyre. On the other hand, we may look at
the world as a place with known quantities. By bringing together Hermes
and Apollo in friendship, Zeus enables his cosmos to reach a delicate balance between innovation and tradition.56 By the end of the Hymn, Hermes
and Apollo share roles as gods of herding, music, and prophecy.
LAUGHTER IN THE AUDIENCE
There is yet one more level where we can consider the role that laughter plays in this hymn. As Mary Depew argues, we should view hymns
as gifts for the gods that they celebrate. It is then the goal of hymns to
weave together the web that connects gods and mortals (2000.69). Scholars who have dealt with the Homeric Hymn to Hermes inevitably mention
the laughter and the humor of the hymn, and thus we should keep in mind
that the laughter of the audience is part of the process of the laughter we
find within the hymn.57 Through laughter that develops out of comic surpluses, the hymnist encourages his Greek audience to celebrate Hermes’
ability to thrive on his own contradictions. For a god to be a skilled inventor, expert cattle rustler, or practiced legal speaker would not be terribly
surprising, but when combined with the fact that Hermes is emphatically
a baby when he does all of this, the audience can recognize in this gap the
great potential of the god being celebrated.
Through his energy to open up surplus potentials in the world,
Hermes has transformed his brother, who has a history of eliminating rivals,
fixity, whereas Hermes on the boundaries represents mobility. In the interaction between
the two opposites, our world arises.
56 Looking at a story of the Yoruba gods Ifa and Eshu, Hyde 1998.117 sees a parallel to Apollo
and Hermes. As he says: “We get no tragic opposition, then; we get, rather, the creative
play of necessity and chance, certainty and uncertainty, archetype and ectype, destiny and
its exceptions, the way and the no-way, the net of fate and the escape from that net.”
57 I am indebted here to observations made during the 2009 Annual Meeting of the Indiana
Classical Conference in response to an earlier version of this project.
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into a god willing to share in herding, music, and prophecy.58 Though he
has challenged the established order, the representatives of that order ultimately welcome the potential of this new god who resists the stagnation
and rigidification of the cosmos, and this process of welcoming is marked
with key moments of laughter. As we listen and laugh at the exploits of
the young Hermes, we, too, welcome the energy that opens our world to
new possibilities. Though at times we may want to be like Apollo with a
fixed and stable view of things, we are enchanted by Hermes and enticed
to see a world that pleasantly escapes our complete control.59
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